imagine the situation as the personal victim. Participants then read the scenario, which was followed by an elaborate apology from the classmate. Results from both cultures indicated that, compared with the participants in the control condition, the participants in the recall-self-as-wrongdoer condition were significantly more likely to accept the apology from the classmate and forgive the transgression. Expected and unexpected cultural differences also were found.
or effectiveness of accounts depends on whether they are perceived by others as trustworthy and sincere or deceitful and insincere. Among several types of accounts identified (e.g., apology, excuse, justification, and denial), researchers have found apology to be perceived as the most trustworthy and sincere account, and thus the most effective in resolving interpersonal conflicts (Darby & Schlenker, 1982; Gonzales, Manning, & Haugen, 1992; Gonzales, Pederson, Manning, & Wetter, 1990; Hodgins, Liebeskind, & Schwartz, 1996; Holtgraves, 1989; Itoi, Ohbuchi, & Fukuno, 1996; McLaughlin, Cody, & O'Hair, 1983; Ohbuchi et al., 2000; Schoenbach, 1990; Takaku, 2000; Weiner, Graham, Peter, & Zmuidinas, 1991) .
However, it is well understood by lay people and researchers that apologizing for one's misbehavior may not always be perceived as trustworthy and sincere, and thus will not result in a complete resolution of an interpersonal conflict. Although it is the responsibility of the wrongdoer (WD) to start the process of conflict resolution by apologizing, once the WD gives the apology, it is the injured party (IP) who must decide to accept the WD's apology if the transaction is to be completed successfully and constructively. Therefore, whether the conflict is resolved is largely determined by whether the WD's apology is perceived as trustworthy, genuine, and sincere by the IP (Ohbuchi et al., 2000) .
PERSPECTIVE-TAKING APPROACH
Among many possible approaches to increase the likelihood of the IP's accepting the WD's apology, altering the cognitive perspective of the IP is perhaps the most promising. There is a large literature supporting the hypothesis that taking the perspective of another is associated with a variety of prosocial behaviors, such as altruism, cooperation, and the inhibition of destructive/aggressive reactions (Arriaga & Rusbult, 1998; Batson, 1991 Batson, , 1997 Batson et al., 1995; Batson, Early, & Salvarani, 1997; Davis, 1994; Regan & Totten, 1975) .
Guided by the general perspective-taking literature and Robinson's (1994) findings that lies are perceived as less condemnatory when given by participants themselves than when given by others, Takaku (in press) argued that the WD's apology is more likely to be perceived as trustworthy and be accepted by the IP when the IP takes the perspective of the WD. Takaku further argued that the IP's effort to take the perspective of the WD could be facilitated by reminding the IP of his or her own past wrongdoing. Specifically, it is reasoned that inducing such self-awareness reminds the IPs of how easy it is for them to blame others or situations (i.e., making situational attributions) and how difficult it is for them to take personal responsibility (i.e., making dispositional attributions) for negative events. Such self-awareness creates two inconsistent cognitions that lead to a possible dissonance-like discomfort or hypocrisy-induced dissonance, as labeled by Aronson and his colleagues (Aronson, Fried, & Stone, 1991; Fried & Aronson, 1995; Stone, Aronson, Crain, Winslow, & Fried, 1994) . One cognition signals that the IP believes that the WD should be blamed for the negative event, but given the other cognition, the IP realizes that he or she would want to blame others or the situation if he or she were the WD under similar circumstances. To avoid (or reduce) uncomfortable feelings generated by having the two incongruent cognitions, the IP becomes more likely to accept the WD's apology and perceive causes other than those inherent in the WD. These resulting attributional changes should increase the IP's positive (and decrease negative) emotional reactions, and, in turn, these changes in emotional reactions should increase the likelihood of forgiving (Weiner, 1985 (Weiner, , 1986 (Weiner, , 1995 . This causal sequence of experiencing hypocrisy-induced dissonance, which changes attributions and emotional reactions and subsequently leads to forgiveness, has been termed the dissonance-attribution model of interpersonal forgiveness (Takaku, in press ).
The dissonance-attribution model of interpersonal forgiveness was first tested and supported by Takaku (in press). The investigation reported here is an extension of Takaku's study and pursues several goals. The first goal is to replicate Takaku's findings using the same experimental method. The second goal is to investigate the plausibility of the model cross-culturally, using Japanese participants as a comparison group. The third goal is to examine whether Japanese and American participants hold similar or different motivations for forgiving a WD.
MEASURING HYPOCRISY-INDUCED DISSONANCE
In a typical dissonance study, the dissonance experienced by the participants is not measured, and is justified by the manipulation and/or by measures of attitude change (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959) . However, in the present research an attempt is made to measure people's experienced hypocrisy-induced dissonance by including self-report measures. These self-report measures tap participants' awareness of their past misbehaviors, their feeling of being fair, and realizations of being hypocritical during their participation. Using these measures, the present research tested the following hypotheses:
Hypotheses 1a to 1d: Those who are given the dissonance-facilitated perspective-taking manipulation will be (a) more likely to experience hypocrisy-induced dissonance, (b) more likely to make favorable attributions, (c) more likely to experience positive emotions and less likely to experience negative emotions, and (d) more likely to forgive the WD than those who are given the other two perspective-taking manipulations. Hypothesis 2: The relationship between a perspective-taking manipulation and forgiveness is mediated by the amount of hypocrisy-induced dissonance experienced, which leads participants to generate more favorable attributions and to experience more positive and less negative emotions toward the WD.
A CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE
Cross-cultural psychologists (e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Smith & Bond, 1994; Triandis, 1989) have stressed that in collective cultures there are strict social norms governing people's appropriate behaviors, whereas in individualistic cultures people's behaviors are governed by their own internal attributes, such as their personal beliefs or attitudes. Consistent with this notion, Heine and Lehman (1997) argued that cognitive dissonance is more likely to be experienced by North Americans, who possess an independent view of the self, than by Asians, who possess an interdependent view of the self (Markus & Kitayama, 1991) . Specifically, they argued that because the independent view of the self places more importance on one's own attitudes and opinions, viewing one's behaviors or decisions as inconsistent with one's attitudes and opinions would pose a significant threat to North Americans' self-integrity. As a result, these individuals become motivated to reduce dissonance. In contrast, because the core identity of the interdependent self lies within the individual's roles, positions, and relationships, internal attributes such as attitudes and opinions are less relevant to such individuals' identities. Therefore, any inconsistencies between their behavior and attitudes are less likely to be viewed as threatening to their self-integrity, and hence would not elicit dissonance and the motivation to reduce it (Heine & Lehman, 1997; Hiniker, 1969; Hirose & Kitada, 1985; Kudo & Mitsui, 1974) . Does this mean, then, that people with an interdependent construal of the self are also less likely to experience dissonance in a hypocrisy research paradigm? If the answer is yes, then people with an interdependent construal of the self should also be less likely to forgive others when they are reminded of times when they were the WDs in the past. However, past cross-cultural studies on account-giving and conflict resolution strategies (Leung, 1987; Ohbuchi et al., 2000; Ohbuchi & Takahashi, 1994; Takaku, 2000) suggest that collectivists are in general more likely than individualists to prefer nonadversarial strategies to deal with interpersonal conflicts, whereas individualists generally prefer adversarial strategies over nonadversarial ones. These studies, therefore, suggest that collectivists and individualists possess different motives for forgiving others (Ohbuchi & Tedeschi, 1997) . Whereas collectivists are more concerned about maintaining a good relationship with others or maintaining social norms regarding how one ought to behave in a particular situation, individualists are more concerned about protecting their self-identity or maintaining justice regarding what is fair (i.e., one should be punished when he or she is responsible for a misdeed, and should not be punished when he or she is not). These differential motivations suggest that individualists and collectivists may be equally likely to forgive their WD, although the act of forgiving may differentially satisfy individualists' and collectivists' unique motivations. Thus, it is argued that when people are made aware of their past transgressions (i.e., being hypocritical), collectivists are more likely to forgive their WD for relationship or normative reasons (e.g., "Being hypocritical may damage the relationship with my friend; therefore, I will forgive him," or "Being hypocritical is devalued in my culture; therefore, I will forgive him"). Individualists, on the other hand, are more likely to forgive their WD for identity reasons (e.g., "Being hypocritical may damage my self-worth; therefore, I will forgive him") or justice reasons (e.g., "Being hypocritical is unfair to my friend; therefore, I will forgive him") than for relationship and normative reasons. Hence, regardless of participants' cultural background, being made aware of their own past transgressions should generate more forgiveness than not being made aware of their past transgressions, although the implicit goals for doing so may vary across cultures. Therefore, the following hypothesis is tested:
Hypothesis 3: Although being hypocritical should lead to more forgiveness via changes in attributions and emotions regardless of culture, it activates different conflict-resolution motives, arousing more relationship and normative motives for collectivists and more identity and justice motives for individualists.
METHOD PARTICIPANTS
To represent a collective culture, 77 participants (42 males and 35 females; mean age = 21.36 years) were recruited from psychology classes in an urban university in the northeast region of Japan. Participants recruited in Japan were limited to native Japanese. To represent an individualistic culture, 102 American participants (40 males and 62 females; mean age = 21.5 years) were recruited from psychology classes at the Claremont colleges in Claremont, California. The American participants were limited to students who were born in the United States. All participants received extra course credit for their participation.
DESIGN
A hypothetical vignette was used in which participants read a scenario that described an interpersonal conflict situation at school. Two independent variables included one blocking factor (culture) and one manipulated between-subjects factor (type of perspective-taking manipulation). Three levels of the perspective-taking manipulation included recalling self as WD, imagining the victimized other (i.e., imagine WD), and participants' own perspectives as an IP. The participants were randomly assigned to one of these conditions.
The dependent measures included attribution-related cognitions (i.e., locus, controllability, and stability dimensions of causation), emotions (positive and negative), and behavioral intention (i.e., forgiveness). Furthermore, the degree to which participants felt hypocritical while answering the questionnaire was also measured, as was the degree of their various motives (or goals) for resolving the conflict (i.e., relationship, normative, identity, and justice).
MATERIALS
Participants were asked to read and imagine an incident in which something happened to them that they wish had not happened. Before reading and imagining the scenario, the perspective-taking manipulation was introduced. Participants in the recalling self as WD perspectivetaking condition were given the following instruction:
Please take a moment and visualize an event in which you broke a promise with, forgot to do something for, or intentionally/unintentionally hurt others in the past. Please try to remember how you thought, felt, and behaved in that situation. Briefly describe the event you just considered below.
Participants in the imagining victimized other and the self as victim perspective-taking conditions were given the following instruction:
The following scenario describes a situation in which something happened to you that you wish had not happened. While you read the following scenario, please try to imagine how your classmate would think, feel, and behave when he was confronted by you (imagining other condition); or, while you read the following scenario, please try to imagine how you would think, feel, and behave if something like this really happened to you (own condition). Try to concern yourself with attending to all the information presented, and concentrate on visualizing how your classmate would think, feel, and behave when he was confronted by you. Each of these instructions was then followed by the following scenario:
You and your classmate were preparing for an important final exam. A day before the final, your classmate asked you if he could borrow your notes from the previous week in order to make copies. You agreed to the request and told him to bring them back as soon as possible. An hour later, he had not returned from making copies. You waited for another hour. You were getting very anxious and frustrated because you could not study without those notes. Because you could no longer wait for your classmate, you decided to leave a note on the door of the study room, asking for the notes back as soon as possible. Three hours later, your classmate returned to your apartment and brought back the notes, which were torn. You were very angry and asked him what had happened.
Following the scenario, participants read the classmate's apology for returning the torn notes late:
The copy machine on campus was not working. So, I went to an offcampus copy store. That took an hour. But, the copy machine there ate your notes and damaged them. I returned as soon as possible. I apologize. I am so sorry. It is entirely my fault. I feel awful and terribly guilty; I must have caused you a lot of aggravation. I will do anything to make up for this.
After reading the classmate's apology, the participants were asked to complete questions regarding attributions, emotional reactions, and the likelihood of forgiveness.
Attributions. To measure attributions made for the classmate's behavior, the Revised Causal Dimension Scale was employed (McAuley & Shaffer, 1993) . Two items were used to measure each of the causal dimensions (stability, locus, external controllability, and personal controllability). To tap the stability dimension of the cause, participants were asked to rate the extent to which they perceived the cause to be (a) permanent or temporary, and (b) stable over time or variable over time on a 9-point Likert scale ranging from 9 (permanent/stable over time) to 1 (temporary/variable over time). For the locus dimension, participants were asked to rate the extent to which they perceived the cause to be something (a) that reflects an aspect of your classmate or that of the situation, and (b) that is about your classmate or about others, on a scale ranging from 9 (internal) to 1 (external). For the external controllability condition, they were asked to rate the extent to which they perceived the cause to be something (a) over which someone else has control or no one else has control, and (b) that was under the power of someone else or not under the power of someone else, on a scale ranging from 9 (controllable by others) to 1 (not controllable by others). For the personal controllability dimension, they were asked to rate the extent to which the cause was (a) avoidable or not by the classmate, and (b) controllable by the classmate or not controllable, on a scale ranging from 9 (controllable) to 1 (uncontrollable).
Emotional reactions. Selected affective reaction measures were taken for negative (e.g., Shaver, Schwarts, Kirson, & O'Connor, 1987) , that is, angry, annoyed, and bitter, and for positive emotions (e.g., Toi & Batson, 1982) , that is, sympathetic, sorry, and compassionate. Each item was rated on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 9 (very much). For combining these measures, a General Positive Emotion index and a General Negative Emotion index were created.
Intention to forgive. A three-item measure of behavioral intentions assessed the degree to which the participants were willing to forgive the classmate. These three items were: (a) "I would forgive my classmate," (b) "I would hold a grudge against my classmate," and (c) "I would condone my classmate's action." Each item was rated on a scale ranging from 1 (definitely would not) to 9 (definitely would).
Measures of hypocrisy-induced dissonance.
To determine if dissonance was successfully induced, the participants indicated on a 9-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (definitely does not describe me) to 9 (definitely describes me) the extent to which each of the following three statements described their feeling: "I was aware of my past misbehavior," "I would feel hypocritical if I judge myself as a more trustworthy and dependable person than he is," and "It would be unfair for me to think that I am a more responsible person than he is given my own past misbehavior."
Measures of multiple motives. Items to measure participants' conflict resolution motives were taken from Fukushima and Ohbuchi (1996) and modified according to the scenario. For the relationship motive, the item was: "I was concerned about maintaining a good relationship with my classmate." For the normative motive, the item used was: "I was concerned about the appropriateness of my reaction in such a situation." The identity motive was measured by the following: "I was concerned about being perceived as a good and kind person." The justice motive was measured by the following: "I was concerned about justice and fairness in this situation." All items were measured on a 9-point Likert-type scale ranging from 9 (definitely describes me) to 1 (definitely does not describe me).
Translation of materials. The questionnaire was produced in both English and Japanese, and respondents completed the questionnaire in their native language. The original English version of the questionnaire was first translated into Japanese, which was then translated back into English by a second translator to ensure equivalence in meaning.
RESULTS

CREATING INDICES
Dependent measures that were designed to tap constructs of interest were analyzed for internal consistency. Cronbach's alphas for controllability, locus, stability, general positive emotion, general negative emotion, hypocrisy-induced dissonance, and intention to forgive were . 92, .74, .91, .82, .88, .95, and .83, respectively, for Americans; and .79, .65, .84, .93, .84, .89, and .80 , respectively, for Japanese.
MULTIVARIATE TEST
To test the overall effects of culture and type of perspective taking on all indices, a 3 (type of perspective taking)´2 (culture) multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was computed for all indices. Wilks's test yielded a significant main effect for type of perspective taking, F(14, 338) = 8.38, p < .001, a significant main effect for culture, F(7, 169) = 2.61, p < .02, and a significant interaction effect between type of perspective taking and culture, F(14, 338) = 2.35, p < .005. To interpret this interaction, further analyses were conducted separately for each culture.
RESULTS FOR AMERICAN SAMPLE
Testing Hypotheses 1a to 1d. A one-way (type of perspective taking) MANOVA was computed for all indices. The MANOVA yielded a significant effect for the type of perspective taking, F(7, 96) = 16.55, p < .001. Results of the subsequent univariate analyses (using Tukey HSD tests) and descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1 . As shown in Table 1 , the manipulation had a significant effect on all of the dependent variables, except for the locus dimension of causation.
Hypothesis 1a. As predicted, those who were given the "recall self as a WD" instruction were significantly more likely to experience hypocrisy-induced dissonance (M = 6.66, SD = 1.52) than those who were given the "imagine victimized other" perspective-taking instruction (M = 3.68, SD = 2.21) or own perspective-taking instruction (M = 3.59, SD = 1.83).
Hypothesis 1b. As predicted, for the controllability dimension, those who were given the "recall self as a WD" instruction were significantly more likely to perceive the cause of the transgression to be less controllable by the WD (M = 3.15, SD = 1.59) than were those who were given the "imagine victimized other" (M = 5.45, SD = 2.57) or own perspective-taking instruction (M = 4.59, SD = 1.72). For the stability dimension, those who were given the "recall self as a WD" condition were significantly more likely to perceive the cause to be less stable over time (M = 2.29, SD = 1.34) than were those who were given the "imagine victimized other" instruction (M = 3.42, SD = 2.23) or own perspective-taking instruction (M = 4.61, SD = 2.24). Those who were given the "imagine victimized other" instruction were also significantly more likely to perceive the cause to be less stable over time than were those who were given the own perspective instruction.
Hypothesis 1c.
As predicted, for the positive emotional reaction, those who were given the "recall self as a WD" instruction experienced a significantly more positive emotional reaction (M = 5.82, SD = 1.35) than did those who were given the "imagine victimized other" instruction (M = 4.55, SD = 1.28) or the own perspective-taking instruction (M = 3.59, SD = 1.30). For the negative emotional reactions, it was also found that those who were given the "recall self as a WD" instruction experienced significantly less negative emotional reaction (M = 4.14, SD = 1.78) than did those who were given the "imagine victimized other" instruction (M = 5.49, SD = 2.19) or the own perspective-taking instruction (M = 6.37, SD = .81). Note. Responses could range from 1 to 9; the higher the number, the greater the degree of each variable (except for locus, in which 9 = internal and 1 = external). Within a given row, cells not sharing the same superscript differ significantly (p < .05).
Hypothesis 1d. Again as predicted, those who were given the "recall self as a WD" instruction were significantly more likely to forgive the WD (M = 7.78, SD = .98) than were those who were given the "imagine victimized other" instruction (M = 5.78, SD = 2.00) or the own perspective-taking instruction (M = 4.93, SD = 1.00).
Testing Hypothesis 2. Before testing the hypothesized causal model, all relevant variables in the causal model were intercorrelated (see Table 2 ). According to the hypothesized causal model based on Weiner's attribution theory of emotion and motivation (1985, 1986, 1995) , the relationship between apology and perspective taking on one hand and interpersonal forgiveness on the other hand is mediated by the IP's attributional and emotional changes. More specifically, for the model tested in the present study, it was hypothesized that these changes in attributions and emotional reactions are direct results of the IP's motivation to reduce hypocrisy-induced dissonance. Table 3 reports results of a path analysis using a series of multiple regression analyses.
In the first three analyses, each of the three dimensions of causation (locus, controllability, and stability) was related to the hypocrisyinduced dissonance. As indicated in the first three models in Table 3 , hypocrisy-induced dissonance significantly predicted the controllability, locus, and stability dimensions of the causation (standardized betas = -.447, -.440, and -.393, respectively; p < .01). These results revealed that the more participants felt hypocritical, the less controllable, internal, and stable the cause was perceived to be. In the fourth model, the hypocrisy-induced dissonance and all of the causal dimensions were entered in the equation to predict positive emotional reactions. It was found that the only variables that significantly predicted the amount of the positive emotional reaction were hypocrisy-induced Note. n = 104. All correlation coefficients are significant at the p < .01 level, except for the correlation coefficient between locus and positive emotion. The higher the number, the greater the degree of each variable (except for locus, in which 9 = internal and 1 = external).
dissonance and causal locus (standardized betas = .348 and -.271, respectively; p < .05). The more participants felt hypocritical and the more external they perceived the cause of the wrong to be, the more positive emotional reaction was experienced for the classmate. In the fifth model, the same variables used in the fourth model predicted negative emotional reactions. As shown in Table 3 , only hypocrisy-induced dissonance and causal controllability significantly predicted the amount of negative emotional reaction (betas = -.250 and .319, respectively; p < .01). The more hypocrisy-induced dissonance was felt, the less negative emotional reaction was experienced; and the more controllable the cause of the wrong was perceived to be, the more negative emotional reaction was experienced. In the last model, all the variables were entered simultaneously to predict forgiveness. The significant predictors of the forgiveness were hypocrisy-induced dissonance, controllability, and positive and negative emotional reactions (standardized betas = .302, -.292, .167, and -.297, respectively; p < .01; total R 2 = .69). Figure 1 depicts the final model with all significant paths.
RESULTS FOR JAPANESE SAMPLE
Testing Hypotheses 1a to 1d. A one-way (type of perspective taking) MANOVA was computed for all indices. The MANOVA yielded a significant effect for the type of perspective taking, F(7, 69) = 3.63, p < .002. Results of the subsequent univariate analyses and descriptive statistics are reported in Table 4 . As shown in Table 4 , the manipulation had a significant effect on all of the dependent variables, except for the control and locus dimensions of causation. Note. Responses could range from 1 to 9; the higher the number, the greater the degree of each variable (except for locus, in which 9 = internal and 1 = external). Within a given row, cells not sharing the same superscript differ significantly (p < .05).
Hypothesis 1a.
As predicted, those who were given the "recalling self as a WD" instruction were significantly more likely to experience hypocrisy-induced dissonance (M = 5.43, SD = 2.31) than those who were given the own perspective-taking instruction (M = 3.80, SD = 1.92). Those who were given the "imagine victimized other" instruction (M = 4.56, SD = 1.98) were not different from the "recalling self as a WD" or the own perspective-taking condition.
Hypothesis 1b. As predicted, those who were given the "recalling self as a WD" instruction were significantly less likely to perceive the cause to be stable over time (M = 3.29, SD = 1.89) than those who were given the own perspective-taking instruction (M = 5.43, SD = 2.18). Those who were given the "imagine victimized other" instruction (M = 4.38, SD = 1.80) were not different from the "recalling self as a WD" or the own perspective-taking condition.
Hypothesis 1c.
As predicted, for the positive emotional reaction, those who were given the "recalling self as a WD" instruction experienced significantly more positive emotional reaction (M = 4.90, SD = 1.30) than did those who were given the "imagine victimized other" (M = 3.67, SD = 1.62) or the own perspective-taking instruction (M = 3.97, SD = 1.97). For the negative emotional reactions, it was also found that those who were given the "recalling self as a WD" instruction experienced significantly less negative emotional reaction (M = 4.38, SD = 1.40) than did those who were given the "imagine victimized other" (M = 6.05, SD = 1.33) or the own perspective-taking instruction (M = 5.80, SD = 1.93).
Hypothesis 1d. Those given the "recalling self as a WD" instruction were significantly more likely to forgive the WD (M = 6.74, SD = 1.87) than were those who were given the own perspective-taking instruction (M = 4.93, SD = 1.74). Those who were given the "imagine victimized other" instruction (M = 5.88, SD = 1.69) did not differ from the "recalling self as a WD" or the own perspective-taking condition.
Testing Hypothesis 2. Before testing the hypothesized causal model, all relevant variables in the causal model were intercorrelated (see Table 5 ). Based on these correlations among the relevant variables, a path analysis using a series of multiple regression analyses was performed (see Table 6 ).
In the first three analyses, each of the three dimensions of causation (locus, controllability, and stability) was related to hypocrisy-induced dissonance. As indicated in the first three models in Table 6 , hypocrisyinduced dissonance significantly predicted the controllability and stability dimensions of the causation (standardized betas = -.25 and -.35, respectively; p < .05). The more participants felt hypocritical, the less controllable and the less stable the cause of the wrong was perceived to be. In the fourth model, hypocrisy-induced dissonance and all of the causal dimensions were entered in the equation to predict the positive emotional reactions. It was found that the only variables that significantly predicted the amount of positive emotional reaction were the controllability and stability dimension of causation (standardized betas = -.35 and -.32, respectively; p < .01). The more controllable and Note. n = 77. The higher the number, the greater the degree of each variable (except for locus, in which 9 = internal and 1 = external). *p < .05. **p < .01. the more stable the participants perceived the cause of the wrong to be, the less positive emotional reaction was experienced for the classmate. In the fifth model, the same variables used in the fourth model predicted the negative emotional reaction. As shown in Table 6 , only the controllability and stability dimensions of causation significantly predicted the amount of negative emotional reaction (betas = .39 and .44, respectively; p < .01). The more controllable and the more stable the cause of the wrong was perceived to be, the more negative emotional reaction was experienced by the participants. In the last model, all variables were entered simultaneously to predict the degree of forgiveness. The only significant predictor of forgiveness was negative emotional reaction (standardized beta = -.30, p < .01, total R 2 = .42). The less negative emotional reaction experienced for the classmate, the more likely the participants were to forgive the classmate. Figure 2 depicts the final model with all significant paths.
Testing Hypothesis 3.
To test whether collectivists and individualists possess different conflict resolution motives, a 2 (culture)´4 (motives) repeated measures ANOVA was first conducted. There was a significant interaction between culture and motivation, F(3, 537) = 10.84, p < .001. To interpret this interaction, a series of one-way ANOVAs was conducted. The results of these analyses are reported in Table 7 . As predicted, compared with Japanese participants, American participants are significantly more likely to report that they were concerned about justice and fairness in this situation (i.e., justice motive). However, the expected difference was not found between cultures on the identity motive item. On the other hand, compared with American participants, Japanese participants are significantly more likely to report that they were concerned about maintaining a good relationship with their classmate (i.e., relationship motive), and how similar others would react in the situation (i.e., normative motive). 
DISCUSSION
Guided by Robinson's (1994 Robinson's ( , 1996 approach to studying the complex interrelationships among language, cognitions, emotions, social perceptions, and judgments, the present study investigated the effectiveness of apology and perspective-taking effort on interpersonal forgiveness across cultures. Specifically, it was argued that even though an elaborate apology given by the WD has been found to be the most polite, trustworthy, and effective account in resolving an interpersonal conflict, it may not be sufficient to transform the IP's retaliatory motivation into forgiveness. The present study replicated the findings from Takaku (in press), in which being given an elaborate apology when the IPs were reminded of their own past wrongdoing facilitated the process of motivational transformation.
The present results also clarified the question of whether hypocrisyinduced dissonance was responsible for facilitating this motivational transformation. By including self-report measures of hypocrisyinduced dissonance, direct tests of the effects of hypocrisy-induced dissonance on participants' attributional judgments and their emotional reactions toward the WD were possible. Consistent with predictions, it was found that in both countries, those who were reminded of their own past wrongdoing experienced more hypocrisy-induced dissonance than did those who were not. It was argued that to reduce such cognitive discomfort, participants would view the WD more positively, as they would have wanted to be perceived by others when they had misbehaved in the past. Thus, the present studies tested and supported the hypotheses that these participants would make more favorable attributions for the cause of the wrong committed against them, and would experience more positive and less negative emotional reactions toward their WD. As a result of such a motivational transformation, the dissonance-induced participants became more forgiving than did the non-dissonance-induced participants. This prediction was further supported by the path analysis conducted for the data obtained in each culture. Each path analysis revealed that the relationship between the perspective-taking manipulation and the participants' decision to forgive was indeed mediated by the hypocrisy-induced dissonance they experienced, which led the participants to make more favorable attributions and to experience more positive and less negative emotional reactions.
Although the general hypotheses tested in the present studies have been confirmed, notable differences were also observed between the two countries. First, although the participants in the United States perceived the cause of the wrong to be significantly less controllable by the WD when they were given the "recall self as a WD" instruction, Japanese participants' perception of controllability was not influenced by the perspective-taking manipulation. This particular finding is consistent with the notion that in collective societies, people's behaviors are seen as being influenced more by their cultural norms and/or culturally defined roles than by their own personal choice. Thus, collectivists may be less likely to evaluate others' behavior as good or bad on the basis of how personally controllable the behavior was, but they are more likely to do so on the basis of how likely the same behavior will be repeated in the future (i.e., stability dimension). This notion was supported further by the finding that, among the three causal dimensions, only the stability dimension was significantly influenced by the manipulation for the Japanese participants, while both the controllability and stability dimensions were significantly influenced by the manipulation for the American participants.
Although the results of the path analyses indicated that hypocrisyinduced dissonance played a major role in facilitating the process of motivational transformation in both countries, the strength of its effects on influencing attributional judgments, emotional reactions, and the decision to forgive the WD was greater in the United States than in Japan. For the American participants, hypocrisy-induced dissonance not only predicted how people perceived the three causal dimensions, but also directly predicted how they felt toward their WD and their decision to forgive. This implies that above and beyond the mediating effects of attributions and emotions on their decision to forgive, hypocrisy-induced dissonance has a unique predictive power to determine Americans' emotional reactions and their decision to forgive. On the other hand, for the Japanese participants, hypocrisyinduced dissonance only predicted how people perceived two of the three causal dimensions (i.e., controllability and stability, but not locus), but not emotional reactions or their decision to forgive.
Furthermore, a closer look at each of the models revealed that, for the American participants, the path that accounted for the most variance in forgiveness is through the controllability dimension and/or negative emotional reaction, although there is a direct path from hypocrisy-induced dissonance to forgiveness. That is, the more hypocrisy, the more uncontrollable the cause; the more uncontrollable the cause, the less negative the emotional reaction; the less negative the emotional reaction, the more forgiveness.
On the other hand, the path that accounted for the most variance in forgiveness for the Japanese sample is through the stability dimension and the negative emotional reaction. That is, the more dissonance, the less stable the cause; the less stable the cause, the less negative the emotional reaction; the less negative the emotional reaction, the more forgiveness. These findings again support the notion that although individualists are more likely than collectivists to evaluate others' behaviors on the basis of individual choice, collectivists are more likely than individualists to evaluate others' behaviors on the basis of how likely the same behavior will be repeated in the future.
The results also supported the hypothesis that being hypocritical may activate different conflict-resolution motives for the two countries. It was found that, compared with American participants, being hypocritical activated more of the relationship motives (i.e., concern about maintaining a good relationship with the WD) and more of the normative motives (i.e., concern about the appropriateness of their behavior in the situation) for the Japanese participants. On the other hand, compared with Japanese participants, being hypocritical activated more of the justice motives (i.e., concern about justice and fairness in the situation) in the American participants. Although it was expected that being hypocritical would activate more of the identity motives in the American participants than in the Japanese participants, this hypothesis was not confirmed.
Overall, the results showed that, although there were some variations in how hypocrisy-induced dissonance influences cognitive and emotional judgments concerning the WD and activating different goals for resolving conflicts between cultures, there was strong support for the general hypothesis that hypocrisy-induced dissonance facilitates the forgiveness process.
POSSIBLE LIMITATIONS
Even though the present study revealed some provocative cultural differences, they must be interpreted with caution. First, because no direct measure of the perceived sincerity of the apology was collected, one could interpret some of the cultural differences observed in this study in terms of the difference on this dimension. However, although this is a plausible alternative explanation of some of the cultural differ-ences observed in this study, this explanation does not fit the overall pattern of data quite well, in that the only difference found between the two cultures was on the controllability dimension. Furthermore, even though the effect of the manipulation on the controllability dimension was not significant for the Japanese sample, the direction of the mean differences is consistent with the American data. Thus, there does not appear to be differences in the perceived sincerity of the apology between the two cultures. It may, however, exist between the three experimental conditions, which is most likely to be the direct result of the manipulation.
Second, with regard to the cultural difference found in the effectiveness of the manipulation on the controllability dimension, this difference may have been due to differential reliabilities of the controllability scale for the two cultures (a = .92 for the United States; a = .79 for Japan). Furthermore, given that the direction of the mean differences is very similar across cultures, increasing the reliability of the controllability scale for the Japanese sample may bring the result to the level of significance, which may negate this apparent cultural difference on the controllability dimension. Likewise, failure to find any significant differences among the three experimental conditions in either sample with regard to the locus dimension may also have been due to the marginal reliabilities of the locus scale (a = .74 for the United States; a = .65 for Japan).
In conclusion, to increase the overall validity of the study, it is recommended that the future investigations include direct measures of the perceived sincerity of the apology and modify the locus and the controllability scales.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
If one were to make a conclusive statement based on the present research, it would be the following: As it takes two to start an interpersonal conflict, it also takes two to resolve it. Although this is an easy statement for people to understand when they are not involved in an actual conflict with others, once they become involved, this statement becomes very threatening. However, unless each of the parties involved in a conflict goes beyond his or her self-centered world, a successful resolution of the conflict is impossible. Specifically, a conflict is more easily resolved if a WD accepts personal responsibility and offers a genuine apology than if he or she tries to minimize personal responsibility by offering an excuse, a denial, or a lie. Likewise, a conflict is more easily resolved if an IP tries to recognize and understand some situational, uncontrollable, and unstable causes of the wrong, rather than focusing only on the negative attributes of the WD. This is facilitated by recalling one's own past wrongdoing.
Finally, the present research was inspired by Robinson's tireless devotion and remarkable contribution to the examination of the complex interrelationships among language, cognition, emotions, culture, and other important situational and personal variables. Through identifying important determinants of account acceptance and providing an alternative causal process by which apology leads to forgiveness, it was hoped that Robinson's legacy would be carried into the future.
